The wording of section 210.830 and the case law interpreting this provision require that a child who is the subject of an action for paternity under the UPA be designated as a party to the proceedings. D.E.W. v. T.R.W., 6 pp.3d 181, 182 (Mo.App.S.D.1999); R.W.B., 947 S.W.2d at 817-18; S.J.V. By Blank v. Voshage, 860 pp. W.2d 802, 804-05 (Mo.App.1993); Lechner, 811 p.W.2d to 861 [5]. A minor may be a plaintiff in a UPA case only if he or she is “initiated and prosecuted by a duly appointed guardian of such a minor or, failing that, by another friend named in such a civil action”. Rule 52.02(a) (emphasis added). See Voshage, 860 p.W.2d, p.
804. As noted above, the trial court did not appoint anyone as the son`s closest friend, and the action was not brought and continued on Son`s behalf by a duly appointed guardian. Therefore, Son was never a co-plaintiff in this case. “Section 2261 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 requires that the application and affidavit be made by the party, and it has been held that this means the party in its own person and not through an agent or counsel. Knappen v. Chillicothe, 89 MB. 226, 1 p. W. 23.
But it was never decided when a toddler complains about his next friend that the request cannot be made by the next friend. 507.184. 1. The following friend, guardian, tutor or curator, subject to court approval, has the power and authority to waive a jury and to refer to the court for decision any matter relating to such action or proposed settlement. Here, the father tried to make Son a participant in the action by referring to himself as the son`s closest friend. In this regard, the father titled his plea on his behalf individually and also as a son`s next friend. The father also submitted: (1) a separate written request for appointment as the son`s next friend, (2) written consent to act as the son`s closest friend, and (3) a proposal for appointment as the son`s next friend. However, it is not apparent from the minutes that the court of first instance ever designated the father or anyone else as the son`s closest friend. The mere assertion in a petition that one parent is the child`s closest friend does not create a legal relationship with the next friend. R.W.B. v. T.W., 947 S.W.2d 815, 817[2] (Mo.App.1997); Lechner v.
Whitesell von Whitesell, 811 S.W.2d 859, 861[3] (Mo.App.1991). The facts are as follows: on November 16, 1906, Albert Newton Moore, an infant over fourteen years of age, filed his petition in the District Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, stating that he intended to sue the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in that court and prayed for the appointment of a future friend; George Safford of St. Louis was named his closest friend. Accordingly, a motion was filed in this state court on Moore`s behalf by his closest friend against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for personal injury. After service of the summons, but before a response was due, the railroad filed its request for removal in the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of the Judicial District of Eastern Missouri. This request for expungement was based on a different nationality and alleged that the applicant Moore was a citizen and resident of the State of Illinois; that Safford, the closest friend, was a resident and citizen of the State of Missouri, and the defendant, a corporation incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and a citizen and resident of that State. The motion and bail were duly made, and the case was referred to the United States Circuit Court. Subsequently, and on March 22, 1907, the plaintiff filed an amended application with this court. 25.
By agreement between the parties, the defendant was given time to respond to the plaintiff`s amended request. Three or four times thereafter, defence counsel for both parties made arrangements for continuation. In September 1907, an applicant`s request for remand was denied, and a subsequent application for review of that decision was also denied. Subsequently, this application was submitted for Mandamus. It is clear that a next friend can choose the court where the lawsuit should be brought. Although nothing can be done that infringes the essential rights of the minor, the mere choice of one of the many competent courts cannot be considered an act prejudicial to the minor. Certainly, the decision to recognize the jurisdiction of a United States court is not an act that affects essential rights. In Kingsbury v.
Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 33 L. ed. 1047, 10 Sup. 638, where the following friend agreed that a case of error could be heard by a major division of the Supreme Court of Illinois other than that in which it was tried, and at an earlier term of that court, where such an error could reasonably be heard, and also waived the enforcement of a guarantee of appeal by the opposing party, if the child was found to be bound by such an act, the court stated (p. 680): “Now it is argued that the Supreme Court of the State sitting in the Great Central Division could only decide these appeals by consent, and that the next friend and guardian of the trial was not legally able to: to give such consent. It is undoubtedly the rule in Illinois, as elsewhere, that a closest friend or guardian cannot waive ad litem the rights of the child by confession or provision. The court, whose task is to protect the interests of the child, should ensure that the child is not heard by those who receive him or appoint him to represent him. However, this rule does not prevent the guardian from entering into such agreements that facilitate the decision on the case in which the rights of the child are concerned. “A next friend is neither the agent nor the lawyer of his ward.
An agent or lawyer derives his authority as such from his principal, but a child cannot appoint an agent and authorize him to perform an act that he is unable to do under the law itself. The next friend does not derive his authority from the child, and his function is not based on that authority, either explicitly or implicitly. G.L. (father) brought an action against C.D. (mother) to have him declared the father of J.L. (son). He also asked the mother for custody of the son and family allowances. The mother did not contest paternity, but sought custody and alimony. After a hearing, the trial court awarded the father custody of the son and ordered the mother to pay maintenance. The mother appeals. On one of her many points, the mother accuses the court of having made a reversible error in not naming a future friend for her son. We agree.
We turn around and take remand. “The 1887 Act, both in its original form and amended in 1888, restores the rule that no civil action may be brought against a person in a district other than that in which he resides, but omits the clause permitting a defendant to be sued in the district in which he is situated and adds this clause: “However, if jurisdiction is based solely on the fact that the action is brought between citizens of different States, the action may be brought only in the district in which the plaintiff or defendant is domiciled.” 24 Stat. to L. 552, c. 373; 25 Stat. to L. 434, c. 866, U.
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508. As the Court held, the last clause is a reservation to the following preceding clause, which prohibits any action brought in a district other than that in which the defendant resides; and the consequence is that “jurisdiction must be invoked on any of the grounds set forth in this article, other than the nationality of the parties, in the district in which the defendant resides; However, if jurisdiction is based solely on the fact that the parties are nationals of different States, the action may be brought in the district where the plaintiff or defendant is domiciled. McCormick reaps Mach.