On the basis of the C.J.S. judgment, subrogation transfers to the purchaser all the creditor`s rights, privileges, remedies, privileges, judgments and hypothecs, subject to the limitations and conditions binding on the creditor; However, the purchaser has no more extensive rights than the creditor. [18] This stage of the case could probably be summarily resolved by saying that the doctrine of subrogation, when applied to subrogation, gives the creditor all the rights to which the applicant is thus entitled. Second, the collection of full compensation from the insured by the insurer establishes appropriate or statutory subrogation by operation of law. If the amount collected does not fully compensate the insured for the damage, the insurer partially passes into the rights of the insured to the extent that the former has paid the latter. The insured reserves the right to claim the difference from the offender within the framework of the initial obligation. The right to subrogation is of the utmost fairness. The damage is mainly that of the insured, but after reimbursement or compensation, it becomes the loss of the insurer (44 hours. Jur. 2d 746, note 16, citing Newcomb vs.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St. 382). The expression “the insurance company acquires the rights of the insured against the injured party or the person who has breached the contract” in Article 2207 quoted above means only what it clearly states: that the insurance company acquires the rights of the insured only to have a cause of action against the injured party or the person who has breached the contract, or the obligation of the latter due to an administrative offence or breach of contract. This is the only legal and logical conclusion that can be inferred from the quoted part of Article 2207. If the obligation of the infringer or the person who breached the contract “arises from the law”, what defence can the former then invoke to exonerate him or limit his liability? I submit that the grounds he can raise are the same as those he can raise against the original applicant, that is, the defences available in quasi-delict or infringement proceedings. “There are a few recognized exceptions to this rule. For example, if the insured, on his own initiative, exonerates the author or third party liable for the loss or damage from liability, the insurer`s right of subrogation is infringed [Phoenix Ins. Co.
of Brooklyn v. Erie & Western Transport, Co., 117 US 312, 29 L. Ed. 873 (1886); Insurance Company of North America v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 229 F 2d 705 (1956). Even if the insurer pays the insured the value of the lost property without notifying the carrier that settled the insured`s claim in good faith, the settlement binds both the insured and the insurer, and the carrier cannot sue the carrier for its right of subrogation [McCarthy v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., 45 phil. 488 (1923)]. And if the insurer pays the insured damages that do not represent a risk covered by the policy, thus making a “voluntary payment”, the insurer does not have the right to subcontract the third party responsible for the damage [Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening v. Qua Chee Gan, G.R. No. L-22146, 5.
September 1967, 21 SCRA 12]. However, we note that we made this statement with respect to the jurisdictional issue before us. We concluded that the District Court had personal jurisdiction over Glassing for the unlawful conduct in the state of Montana, and that the judgment was rendered for that unlawful conduct. Therefore, the statement does not support St. Paul`s argument that his rights of appeal flow from the judgment. Both RTC and CA considered that UCPB Gen`s plea was not yet time-barred, since the applicable limitation period was 10 years on the basis of legal subrogation, which they considered to be a legal obligation under Article 1144 [1] of the Civil Code, and not 4 years on the basis of an act assimilated to an act (Article 1146, paragraph (2). According to the applicant, the assignment of credit constitutes a traditional subrogation which requires the consent of the original parties to the loan agreement, namely Ms Picache (the creditor) and the applicant (the debtor); and the third person, the defendant (the assignee). Since the applicant never consented to the assignment of credit, the transfer of the defendant to Ms Picache`s rights as a creditor under that assignment has no effect. Admittedly, the contract of carriage concluded by Caltex and Vector did not create a legal obligation for Vector and Soriano to pay the defendant`s claim for reimbursement, since it concerned only the contract for the carriage of Caltex`s oil cargo. As the Court rightly stated in Pan Malayan Insurance Corporation v. (CA), op. cit. O., “does not depend on a contractual relationship or on a written assignment of claims, [but] it arises simply from the payment of the insurance claim by the insurer”.
In addition, fairness plays a very important role in determining the scope of legal subrogation. I find it very unfair to continue to adhere to the old and now abandoned legal doctrine that the right of the fair debtor to recovery arises from the time of payment of the injured party`s liability to the trustee and continues for 10 years thereafter. It is unfair when compared to the situation of an injured party and its victim, if an insurer does not play a role. In the latter case, the cause of action arises from the date of discovery of the offence and offence until four years later. In addition to the “consideration clause” cited by the Court of Appeal in its decision, we also note that on the signature page, just below the space reserved for the signatures of the applicant and the respondent, are the words “WITH OUR CONFORMANT”. Under this spelling, the words “ANGLO-ASEAN BANK AND TRUST” were handwritten. In our view, this provision, which takes into account Anglo-Asean Bank`s signed compliance with the above-mentioned ambulance pre-clause leads, leads to the conclusion that both parties intended Anglo-Asean Bank to express its consent and agreement with the contractual agreement between the claimant and the defendant. The fact that the Anglo-ASEAN Bank had not given such consent rendered the agreement invalid since, as already noted, the consent of the debtor was required for the transfer of a third party to the rights of a creditor.